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The Constitution and the American Indian:
Past and Prologue
By JERRY MUSKRAT*
Introduction
Nineteen hundred and seventy-six is the bicentennial anniversary
of the American Revolution and the establishment of the American
nation. Such an occasion gives us cause to re-examine America's past,
appraise her present, and plan for her future. For most Americans
it is a time to celebrate and to rededicate themselves to the American
principles of constitutional law and government.
To the American Indian, however, the Bicentennial is something
quite different. Most American Indians do not believe that they have
cause to celebrate the birth of this nation; they see its creation as having
signaled the beginning of the end of American Indian tribal sovereign-
ty, independence, and freedom. Unfortunately, the last 200 years of
American history bear out this belief. For the American Indian, the
American dream in fact has been a nightmare. For 200 years the
Indian nations have suffered cultural and physical genocide. The
United States government has applied a deliberate policy whereby
Indian people have been exterminated, their lands expropriated, their
treaties broken, and their trust betrayed as promises made to them have
gone unkept. To ask that American Indians join in the celebration
of the American Bicentennial is akin to asking them to celebrate their
own funeral.1
For the American Indian a more appropriate anniversary to cele-
brate is the centennial of the battle of the Little Big Horn, or "Custer's
Last Stand." This, the Indian community maintains, is a more ap-
propriate cause for celebration for it represents a victory in the Indian's
struggle for physical and cultural survival. Apart from its obvious
* Director of the Center for American Indian Law and Assistant Professor of
Law at the University of Oklahoma.
1. For further reading on Indians and the Bicentennial, see AMERID CLU, ThE
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, INDIANS AND 1976 (1973).
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historical significance, this centennial occasion has tremendous
symbolic importance to the Indian community that is now, as it was
then, under relentless assault. Its very survival is in question. The
Little Big Horn was a military victory. Today the struggle has moved
from the battlefields into the political and legal arenas. Whereas the
Indian community of the past could and did wage war on those who
threatened it, Indian people of today must learn to use the white man's
way of law and politics if they are to effectively protect and advance
Indian interests.
Although the Bicentennial generally has produced a negative
reaction in the Indian community, there is perhaps a lesson to be
learned by those concerned with American Indian affairs from the
American revolutionary experience. The goals of American revo-
lutionaries 200 years ago were to secure through revolutionary means
the creation of a nation and the establishment of individual freedom.
American Indian activists today have similar goals in that they seek the
regeneration of the Indian nations and the reassertion of individual
Indian rights and liberties. Viewed in this light, it is especially
incongruous that the Declaration of Independence sought to justify
rebellion for these ends and yet 200 years later American Indian
activists seeking similar goals of sovereignty for the Indian nations and
freedom for the Indian people are crushed by the very government the
Declaration of Independence established. Alcatraz, the Bureau of Indi-
an Affairs occupation, Wounded Knee: all of these demonstrated that
as far as Indians are concerned America has either forgotten or turned
its back on the principles enunciated 200 years ago in the Declaration
of Independence.
On the occasion of the American Bicentennial and the Little Big
Horn Centennial it is proper that we examine concepts of nationhood
and individual freedom-the concepts that formed the foundation of
the American Revolution 200 years ago and that are the goals of
American Indians today. Although the Bicentennial may not be a
cause to celebrate, it can present an opportunity for American Indians
to redefine their goals and redouble their efforts to attain them. The
Indian Revolution of 1976 must, of necessity, be a peaceful one. To
establish and secure tribal sovereignty and individual Indian rights and
liberties this revolution must take place within the constitutional frame-
work of American Indian law.
Who is an Indian?
Before discussing Indian law, it is important to consider the
problems inherent in determining to whom it applies. There is a con-
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tinuing legal debate over the proper identification of individuals as
American Indians. In the first instance, it must be recognized that
Indian people do not think of themselves as "American Indians".
Rather, they are Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, Seminoles,
Navajos, Hopi, and so on, identifying primarily with their tribe rather
than with their race. The tribes differ from one another as widely as
the various cultures of Europe differ from one another. Each has its
own unique cultural, religious, political, social, and economic systems.
There are over 260 different tribes, bands, and groups of American
Indians served by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In addition, there are
approximately 300 native Alaskan groups.' Thus, to generalize about
American Indians is to do them a disservice.
The term "American Indian" is itself somewhat controversial.
It is a white man's term and refers to a case of mistaken identity. A
more contemporary term is "Native American," but even this term is
the subject of some controversy and confusion, for it can be used to
describe any person whose origin stems from any of the indigenous
populations of the Western Hemisphere. "American Indian," on the
other hand, refers more narrowly to those peoples within the borders
of the United States. Both terms are imprecise. There must be, as
far as the law is concerned, a more exact means of defining or identi-
fying who is an "American Indian." Various legal standards have been
applied to define "American Indian" by different groups for different
purposes. The principal means used has been "blood quantum," or
the degree of Indian blood a person possesses. This percentage is
usually determined by tracing an individual's genealogy through tribal
or federal records of tribal membership. For most purposes, the
degree of blood quantum is one-quarter, but it may be more or less
for other purposes. Agencies of the federal government, in particular
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and -the Indian Health Service, use the
one-quarter degree blood quantum as the definitional standard of an
American Indian-those with less are considered non-Indian.
The second legal means of defining an American Indian is that
of "self-identification." If a person officially declares himself to be an
American Indian, then he is recognized as such for certain purposes.
The United States Bureau of the Census uses self-identification to
determine racial classification.
2. BUmuAU OF INDIAN AFFAmS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANSWERS
TO YOUR QUESTONS ABOUT AmERcA INDIANs 3 (1970).
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A third method of defining or identifying an American Indian is
that of "community acceptance." In other words, if a person is con-
sidered Indian by the Indian community in which he resides, then he
is considered Indian for certain legal purposes as well. The Indian
community views community acceptance as the most desirable method
of identification for tribal determination of its own membership is seen
as an act of sovereignty. It is important to determine who is an
American Indian because with that status come special legal rights
and privileges that are not available to other persons.
American Indian Law
As a discipline, "American Indian law" refers to contemporary
American law concerned with American Indians. It does not, as is
often mistakenly thought, refer to the traditional or indigenous law of
Indian tribes. The scope of American Indian law is all-encompassing,
as it extends to every area of American law that has any reference
to Indians and includes such varied and traditional subjects as criminal
law, civil law, international law, and constitutional law. Its sources
cover the legal spectrum, but in particular are: special references to
American Indians in the United States Constitution; formal treaties and
agreements between the United States government and various Indian
nations; special legislation pertaining to Indians; administrative rules
and regulations regarding Indian affairs; and court decisions
recognizing the special legal status of American Indians and the en-
suing special relationship between American Indians and the United
States government.3 The difficulty in achieving a coordinated under-
standing of American Indian law is further compounded by legal com-
plexities involving the greater Indian community itself. For example,
the Indian community may be divided into seven distinct legal cate-
gories: (1) federal reservation Indians, (2) state reservation Indians,
(3) urban non-reservation Indians, (4) rural non-reservation Indians,
(5) federally recognized Indians, (6) non-federally recognized Indi-
ans, and (7) terminated Indians (those whose official recognition has
been withdrawn).1 Individuals belonging to each of these categories
occupy distinctly different legal positions vis-a-vis the United States
3. F. COHEN, HANDBOOx OF FEDERAL INDuAN LAw 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
COHEN]'
4. Office of General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Indian Project of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (unpublished memorandum, un-
dated).
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government. Consequently, the rights and liberties available to indi-
viduals in the various classifications differ.
American Indian law is particularly concerned with the legal rights
of American Indian tribes and of American Indians as individuals.
The rights of Indian tribes are based in large part on the concept of
tribal sovereignty, 5 whereas the rights of individual American Indians
are based on both their United States citizenship and their Indian
status. As American citizens, Indians are entitled to all the rights and
privileges afforded every American citizen. As Indians, they occupy
a special status in the law and maintain a special relationship with the
federal government.'
Tribal Sovereignty
The concept of tribal sovereignty predates the creation of the
United States of America. The European colonial powers recognized
the international legal concept of sovereignty and applied it not only
in their dealings with one another but in their initial dealings with the
Indian nations of North America. The principal evidence of this is
that through the treaty making process the European colonial pow-
ers dealt with the American Indian tribes in the same manner as they
dealt with other sovereign states of the world. Today Indian .tribes hold
all sovereign powers unless the federal government appropriates such
powers to itself and either exercises them accordingly, or delegates
them to the states.' This has resulted in a three-way struggle for power
among the federal government, the state governments, and the Indian
tribes themselves.8 In addition, there is competition within each of
these entities.
Legal recognition of American Indian tribal sovereignty was es-
tablished early in American legal history by two landmark decisions
involving the Cherokee nation. The first decision occurred in 1831 in
the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.9 In defense of its sovereign
existence, th Cherokee nation requested the United States Supreme
Court to issue an injunction against Georgia's application of its law to
the Cherokee people. The issue before the Court was framed as a
jurisdictional question: Did the United States Supreme Court have
5. M. PiucE, LAw AND TE AMEmCN INDIAN 118-19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PRICE].
6. COHEN, supra note 3, at xxiv.
7. Id. at 123-24.
8. PRICE, supra note 5, at 1-2.
9. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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original jurisdiction in this case? Jurisdiction depended, the Court
concluded, on whether the Cherokee nation was a foreign state in the
sense intended by article HI, section two of the Constitution. If not, the
Supreme Court was without original jurisdiction. This gave the Court
the opportunity to examine carefully the status of the tribe. The
Cherokees contended that the Cherokee nation was not a state of the
Union, and that individual Cherokees were aliens not owing allegiance
to the United States. Each individual being foreign, the whole must be
foreign. Consequently, the Cherokee nation was a foreign state and
the United States Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over its
controversy with the state of Georgia. Chief Justice Marshall, who
delivered the opinion for the Court, noted -that the relationship between
the Indians and the United States was
perhaps, unlike that of any other two people in existence. In
general, nations not owing a common allegiance, are foreign to each
other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable
by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United
States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist
nowhere else.10
Marshall went on to explain the characteristics of this relationship:
Indian territory was indeed part of the United States; regulation of com-
merce between Indians and foreign nations was within the jurisdiction
of the United States; the Indian nations themselves acknowledged in
their treaties with the United States that they were under its protection;
and the Indians admitted that the United States had the sole and
exclusive right to regulate trade with them and manage all their affairs
as it thought proper. Marshall concluded that Indian tribes within the
boundaries of the United States should be "denominated domestic
dependent nations."11
Marshall also explained another legal implication of this finding:
the United States held the title to Indian territory independent of Indian
will; the Indian nations thus had possessory rights to their territory, but
not ownership rights or title; and at the United States' discretion this
right to possession could cease.' 2 Meanwhile, Marshall continued, the
Indians are in a "state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian."13 Consequently, the Indian
nations are under the protection of the United States. Marshall con-
cluded that foreign nations recognized the sovereign dominion of the
10. Id. at 16.
11. Id. at 17.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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United States over the Indian nations, and any attempt by a foreign
nation to acquire Indian lands or to form a political connection with
them would be considered an invasion of United States territory and an
act of hostility."4 The Court thus held that the Cherokee nation,
though a unique nation, was not a foreign state within the meaning of the
Constitution, and the United States Supreme Court therefore lacked juris-
diction in the case. 5
The extent and nature of American Indian tribal sovereignty was
further elucidated the following year in the case of Worcester v.
Georgia.16 This case again involved the Cherokee nation and its
struggle to preserve its sovereign existence against encroachments by
the state of Georgia. The specific fact situation centered around the
Reverend Worcester, a white man residing within the Cherokee nation.
Reverend Worcester, for political reasons, was convicted and sentenced
under a Georgia law to four years in the state penitentiary. He ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the
application of Georgia law was illegal because of Georgia's wrongful
exercise of jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation.
Again, Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Cherokee nation, he reasoned, was under the protection of the
United States. This, however, did not mean that the Cherokee nation
thereby surrendered its national existence. The relationship was seen
as that of one nation claiming and receiving the protection of another
more powerful nation, and not that of individuals abandoning their na-
tional character and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.'7
Marshall reasoned that the Indian nations had always been considered
distinct independent political communities. For example, the Constitu-
tion, by declaring treaties to be the supreme law of the land, adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations. The Chief
Justice concluded that since we have applied the words "treaty" and
"nation" to the Indians, we mean to accord them the same status as
other nations? 8 Therefore, the Cherokee nation was deemed to be
a nation in the legal sense as well as a distinct community, occupying its
own well-defined territory in which the laws of Georgia had no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia had no right to enter without the assent
of the Cherokees or pursuant to treaties or acts of Congress.' 9 Thus the
14. Id. at 17-18.
15. Id. at 20.
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
17. Id. at 555.
18. Id. at 559-60.
19. Id. at 561.
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Constitution was held to confer on Congress unlimited authority to
deal with the Indian nations. Therefore, Georgia's laws were in-
applicable to the territories of the Cherokee nation and unconstitu-
tional with respect to the United States government, which had sole
jurisdiction in the area of Indian affairs.
Federal Power Over Indian Affairs
The aforementioned cases plainly show that although tribal sover-
eignty was recognized early in American Indian law, it is far from
absolute. The federal government, pursuant to its own sovereign
authority, can exercise considerable powers over Indian affairs. 20  This
federal power emanates from three principal sources. First is the
constitutional source; in particular, the presidential treaty and war
powers and the congressional commerce powers.2' The second source
of federal power in Indian affairs results from court decisions
establishing the guardian-ward relationship. Essentially, this theory is
based on the weakness and dependency of Indian tribes in relation to
the federal government. The guardian-ward theory originally set out
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia2 2 has since been interpreted by the
federal judiciary as a rationalization for the exercise of federal power
against both state and tribal contentiong of sovereignty. The theory
emphasizes the federal government's obligation to assist and protect the
Indian people.23 The third source of federal power rests with the con-
cept of federal ownership of Indian land. In Cherokee Nation, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Indians' dependency upon the federal
government was a consequence of the federal government's holding
title to Indian occupied lands.24 This doctrine of federal ownership
originated in Johnson v. McIntosh,26 in which Chief Justice Marshall
maintained that the title to Indian lands was in the United States and
derived from the right of discovery exercised by the colonial forerunners
of the American nation. Accordingly, Indian tribes held only an ex-
20. COHEN, supra note 3, at xxiv.
21. The following sections of the Constitution have been cited as conferring such
power or authority: art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (the "war making" power); art. II, § 2, cl. 2
(the "treaty making" power); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes); art. 4, § 3, cl. 2 (the power to govern and to dispose of territories or
other property held by the United States); and art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (power to tax and
spend).
22. 30 U.. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
23. CoHEN, supra note 3, at 170.
24. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
25. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
[Vol. 3
Summer 1976] THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 665
elusive right of occupancy, while actual ownership resided in the United
States government.26
The potential range of federal power to control Indian affairs is
practically unlimited. Its actual exercise, however, has been restrained
by the federal judiciary's commitment to tribal sovereignty and by
the federal government's own indecision as to how to deal with
the American Indian. Whereas the Constitution imposes restraints on
the exercise of congressional power with regard to states and
individuals, Congress is under no such constitutional restraint with
regard to Indian affairs. Not only may the authority of the Indian tribe
be withdrawn by the federal government, but the tribe's legal existence
likewise hinges on federal recognition. However, as indicated, the
federal judiciary has never completely accepted the full implications of
congressional plenary power, and has continued to operate under the
theory that tribal sovereignty and federal plenary powers are not
inconsistent. 7
Today tribal sovereignty is still a complicated and often misunder-
stood concept. Obviously, tribal governments are no longer viewed as
separate independent nations. On the other hand, they are recognized
as political units with governmental powers that, though subservient to
the federal government, are nevertheless superior to state governments
in their claim to control of Indian affairs.2 The contemporary
meaning of tribal sovereignty was defined in 1956 in Iron Crow v.
Ogala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation:2 9
It would seem clear that the Constitution, as construed by the
Supreme Court, acknowledges the paramount authority of the Unit-
ed States with regard to Indian tribes but recognizes the existence
of Indian tribes as quasi sovereign entities possessing all the inher-
ent rights of sovereignty excepting where restrictions have been
placed thereon by the United States itself.30
In summary, tribal sovereignty means that the Indian tribe pos-
sesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state.
However, conquest rendered the tribes subject to the legislative powers
of the United States and terminated the external powers of sovereignty
of the tribe. The internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its power of
local self-government, remained intact. In other words, absent quail-
26. Id. at 604, 605.
27. PRcE, supra note 5, at 21.
28. Smith, The Constitutional Status of American Indians, 6 Crvn. RIGHTS DIGE T
12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
29. 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
30. Id. at 92.
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fication by treaties and by express congressional legislation, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes through their
duly constituted organs of government."1 Thus, Indian tribes retain all
their sovereign powers unless the federal government appropriates
such powers to itself for its own use or subsequent delegation to the
states. Therefore, the powers that tribes currently exercise are not
powers delegated by Congress, but rather are powers emanating from
their inherent sovereignty"2 that have not been abrogated by some
congressional action.
Indian Rights and Liberties
The rights and liberties of American Indians as individuals rest
on two fundamental bases in law: United States citizenship and Indi-
an status. Due largely to the 'early acceptance of the concept of tribal
sovereignty in American law, American Indians were not originally
considered citizens under the Constitution. The original Constitution
did not expressly define citizenship, but it did refer to both national
and state citizenship.8 The Constitution, however, did authorize
Congress to "establish a uniform rule of naturalization."3 4  The
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution subsequently provided that
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." 5 Thus, the
Constitution, with the advent of the Fourteenth Amendment, accepted
the British common law doctrine jus soli in defining citizenship at birth
by situs rather than ancestral nationality."6
Despite the Fourteenth Amendment's acceptance of the theory
that citizenship is determined by one's place of birth, the United States
Supreme Court held in Elk v. Wilkins 7 that an Indian born within the
geographical boundaries of the United States was excluded from citizen-
ship upon birth. The Court said that a tribal Indian owed allegiance
31. COHEN, supra note 3, at 123-24.
32. Smith, supra note 28, at 12-13. What is not expressly limited often remains
within the domain of tribal sovereignty simply because state jurisdiction is federally ex-
cluded and governmental authority must be found somewhere. That is a principle to
be applied generally in order that there be no failure of governmental control. CoHEN,
supra note 3, at 396.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; art. I, § 3, cl. 3; art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (with reference
to national citizenship); and art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (with reference to state citizenship).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. Johnson, Sovereignty, Citizenship and the Indian, 15 ARxz. L REV. 973, 992
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
37. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
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to the tribe from birth and therefore was not born "subject to the juris-
diction" of the United States.35 Since this is a crucial element of
United States citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, automatic
citizenship by virtue of birth within the United States was denied the
American Indian.
The alternative method to citizenship conferred by birth is citizen-
ship achieved by naturalization. Congress has adopted two principal
methods of naturalization: (1) through uniform statutory rules of natu-
ralization of individuals, and (2) by treaty or statute under which a
group of individuals can be collectively naturalized. 9 Naturalization
thus afforded the method by which American Indians could acquire
citizenship. Among the different techniques used were: (1) treaties
with Indian tribes, (2) special statutes, (3) general statutes natural-
izing allottees, and (4) general statutes naturalizing other classes of
Indians.40 By 1924, approximately two-thirds of the Indian population
had achieved citizenship status through such procedures. 1 In order
to provide citizenship for the remainder of the American Indian popu-
lation, Congress enacted a collective naturalization law known as the
Indian Citizenship Act of June 2, 1924.42 This legislation provided
that all Indians born in the United States were citizens of the United
States.
Citizenship produced significant effects on the legal status of
individual American Indians. For example, via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Indians, as citizens of the United States, automatically became citi-
zens of the state of their residence. Consequently, they were both state
and United States citizeris and entitled to all the rights and privileges
accorded any other citizen. It was also determined that citizenship
and tribal membership were not incompatible, and that citizenship
did not impair tribal law or tribal existence, Furthermore, citizenship
for tribal members was held not to be incompatible with federal powers
of guardianship, nor did it impair the trust relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes and individuals. 3
38. Id. at 102.
39. Johnson, supra note 36, at 993.
40. Pnscn, supra note 5, at 220-23. Examples of general statutes naturalizing other
classes of Indians include the following: Indian women marrying citizens became citi-
zens by the Act of August 9, 1888, ch. 818, § 2, 25 Stat. 392, and Indian men who en-
listed to fight in World War I could become citizens under .he Act of November 6, 1919,
ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350.
41. CoHEN, supra note 3, at 153.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
43. PRicE, supra note 5, at 225-27.
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Indians, then, are citizens of their tribal entities, of the United
States, and of the state in which they reside-three separate political
sovereignties. Even after the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act,
however, the sovereignty of the individual tribes was still considered a
barrier to application of constitutional restraints upon tribal govern-
ments. Thus, United States citizenship did not bring the same consti-
tutional protections to individual Indians in their relationships to their
tribal governments that it brought from encroachment upon their indi-
vidual liberties by the federal government, and, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, by the state governments. The constitutional restrictions
upon governmental power were held to be inapplicable to tribal
governments unless specific provisions in the Constitution itself or in
congressional acts or treaties directly referred to Indian tribes.44
In Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council,45 the Native
American Church sought an injunction against enforcement of a Navajo
Tribal Council ordinance prohibiting the sale, use, and possession of
peyote. The Native American Church contended that its use of peyote
was religious in nature and therefore should be protected by the First
Amendment from the interference of Indian tribal authorities just as
it is from regulation by federal and state governments. This conten-
tion was rejected. The court held that constitutional restraints upon
Congress and state governments were not applicable to Indian tribal
governments. Relying on Felix Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian
Law, the court stated: "The provisions of the Federal Constitution pro-
tecting personal liberty or property rights, do not apply to tribal ac-
tion."'46 The court explained that the First Amendment placed limitations
upon the actions of Congress and upon the states, but:
Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher than that of
states. They are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of
all powers as such only to the extent that they have expressly been
required to surrender them by the superior sovereign, the United
States. The Constitution is, of course, the supreme law of the
land, but it is nonetheless a part of the laws of the United States.
Under the philosophy of the decisions, it, as any other law, is
binding upon Indian nations only where it expressly binds- them,
or is made binding by treaty or some act of Congress. No provi-
sion in the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to
Indian nations nor is there any law of Congress doing so. It fol-
lows that neither, under the Constitution or the laws of Congress,
do the Federal courts have jurisdiction of tribal laws or regulations,
44. Smith, supra note 28, at 14.
45. 272F.2d 131 (loth Cir. 1959).
46. Id. at 134; cf. CoHEN, supra note 3, at 181;
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even though they may have an impact to some extent on forms
of religious worship. 47
Congress responded in 1968 to a growing concern regarding
the abuse of the constitutional rights of American Indian citizens
by their tribal governments with passage of the 1968 Indian Civil
Rights Act.43 The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) selectively in-
corporates portions of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.
It includes, for example, a free exercise of religion provision, a freedom
of speech provision, a freedom of the press provision, an assurance of
the right of the people to peaceably assemble and to petition, and a
prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law it includes a prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure, a double jeopardy provision,
a protection against self-incrimination, assurances of the right to a
speedy and public trial, and assurances that a defendant is to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of an accusation. Also included are
the rights to be confronted with witnesses, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in one's favor, and to have, at one's own ex-
pense, the assistance of defense counsel. Additional provisions pro-
hibit excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. A
limitation on the penalty or punishment that a tribal court may
impose is established at six months imprisonment or a fine of $500 or
both. Still other provisions include an equal protection clause and a
due process clause. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are pro-
hibited, and a trial by jury of not less than six persons is mandated.
Despite its seeming comprehensiveness, the ICRA omits several im-
portant constitutional guarantees. For example, a prohibition against
laws respecting establishment of religion and a right to an indictment
by a grand jury are absent.49  Congress, exercising its plenary power
in Indian affairs thereby brought to individual Indians civil rights and
civil liberties protections vis-a-vis their tribal governments.
A Regeneration of Tribal Sovereignty and a
Reassertion of Indian Rights and Liberties
Confronted with the legal condition of the American Indian,
modem day proponents of the Indian cause argue for a regeneration
47. 272 F.2d at 134-35.
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-03 (1971).
49. The omission of a prohibition against establishment of religion was made in
deference to tribal cultural considerations.
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of tribal sovereignty and the reassertion of Indian rights and liberties.
Naturally, they look to the law as the means to achieve these ends. In
the area of tribal sovereignty, Indian advocates are pressing for enact-
ment and enforcement of Indian "self-determination!' legislation. In
the Presidents Recommendations for Indian Policy, dated July 8,
1970, 10 the Nixon administration set forth a new directive for the
United States government. Essentially this policy calls for self-de-
termination for Indian people and Indian tribes:
It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal govern-
ment began to recognize and build upon the capacities and insights
of the Indian people. Both as a matter of justice and as a matter
of enlightened social policy, we must begin to act on the basis of
what -the Indians themselves have long been telling us. The time
has come to break decisively with the past -and to create the con-
ditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by
Indian acts and Indian decisions. 51
Accompanying the presidential message were legislative proposals
designed to implement the policy of self-determination.5 2 Of particu-
lar importance, as far as -tribal sovereignty and tribal governmental
power and authority are concerned, were those legislative recommen-
dations designed to ensure the right of Indian people to control and
operate Indian programs currently administered by the federal govern-
ment. Thus, for example, the presidential message included the
recommendation that an Indian tribe determine for itself whether it is
willing and able to assume administrative responsibility for any or all
service programs presently administered by federal agencies. To this
end, the president proposed legislation that would empower a tribe to
take over the control or operation of federally funded and administered
programs in the Department of the Interior and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare whenever the tribal council or compa-
rable community governing group voted to do so.53 Numerous safe-
guards to assure the success of self-determination were included in the
legislative package. Indian control of Indian programs was always to
be a wholly voluntary matter. It would be possible for an Indian group
to select the program or portion thereof that it wanted to run without
assuming responsibility for all of the components. The "right of retro-
cession!' would also be guaranteed, meaning that if a local community
50. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN PoLICY, H.R. Doe. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Doe. No. 363].
51. Id.
52. The principal self-determination legislation enacted to date is the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975). See also 25 U.S.C.
§ 450 (Supp. V, 1975).
53. H.R. Doc. No. 363, supra note 50, at 4.
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elected to administer a program and then later decided to return its
administration to the federal government, it would be able to do so.54
The advantages of self-determination to Indian tribes and Indian
people are apparent. As the presidential message noted:
A policy which encourages Indian administration of these programs
will help build greater pride and resourcefulness within the Indian
community. At the same time, programs which are managed and
operated by Indians are likely to be more effective in meeting
Indian needs. 55
Self-determination "is a new and balanced relationship between the
United States government and -the First Americans."56  This balanced
relationship is a recognition of tribal sovereignty and the ability of Indi-
ans to control their own lives and destinies. Self-determination can
strengthen tribal sovereignty, which in turn will strengthen and
preserve the Indian community and the Indian culture.
The Future of Indian Tribal Sovereignty
and Individual Rights
Proponents of tribal sovereignty look beyond its recognition
by the United States government in terms of constitutional law and
federal legislation. Some look to international law and international
legal analogies to support more extensive tribal sovereignty. Pro-
ponents of the so-called "sovereignty ideology"57 maintain that
contemporary Indian reservations are "island nation societies" and that
under international law American Indian tribes are entitled to inter-
national recognition, including membership in the United Nations, and
to all the other rights and privileges accorded sovereign states. Further,
they argue that the American Indian people are entitled to such inter-
national legal protections as are established by the United Nations in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.58 Pro-
ponents of the sovereignty ideology accordingly contend that any legal
controversies involving the various Indian nations and the United States
government--disputes over the meaning and effect of treaties, for
example-belong before the International Court of Justice at the
Hague. More recent developments in this area include an attempt by
sovereignty proponents to secure United Nations recognition of Amer-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 12.
57. 8 AmERcAN INDLN LAW NEWSLETTER 54 (1975).
58. G.. Res. 217A (Ml), U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948); G.A. Res. 260A (I),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948).
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can Indian tribes similar to that recently granted by the General
Assembly to the Palestine Liberation Organization. To date, these
Indian efforts have had negligible success and have received little
serious consideration. Nevertheless, they are gaining support and
there does appear to be a legal basis for their contentions.59
Indian advocates are concerned as much with the protection and
advancement of the rights of individual Indians as they are with re-
establishing more meaningful tribal sovereignty. Problems arise be-
cause of Indians' multiple citizenship, and those concerned with indi-
vidual Indian rights must concentrate on these special civil rights and
civil liberties issues if they are to effect needed changes. Based on
their American citizenship, American Indians face traditional civil
rights and civil liberties issues in their relationships to state and federal
governments. Based on their Indian status, they have unique civil
liberties problems vis-h-vis their tribal government by virtue of the pro-
visions of the ICRA, and still other unique civil rights problems in-
volving the federal government and its federal Indian services.
Individual Indian rights based on United States citizenship con-
cern traditional civil rights and civil liberties that are available to all
American citizens. The legal basis for such citizen civil liberties is the
United States Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment. Civil liberties problems of a general nature
affecting the Indian community are often the result of racial discrimi-
nation and poverty, problems similar to those experienced by other
racial minorities in this country. The Indian community, however, has
special civil liberties problems of its own that other groups in this
country do not experience. These problems include the use and pos-
session of peyote for religious ceremonies; the wearing of long, braided
hair as an expression of speech, culture, and religion; and the
possession and exchange of feathers of migratory birds for religious
purposes. Recent litigation involving American Indian cultural and
religious practices indicates the currency of these problems. In such
59. For a more detailed discussion, see V. DELORA, Ji., BEHMnD =E TR OF
BRoKEN ThEATIES (1974). Deloria makes an effective argument for tribal or small na-
tion sovereignty. In response to arguments that the Indian tribes are too small and
economically weak to be considered as nations, Deloria refers to historical precedents
and some interesting statistics. For example, the Navajo nation is larger in area than
each of four members of NATO -(Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg), and five of the founding non-European members of the United Nations (Leb-
anon, Haiti, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador). Furthermore, the
Hopi nation is larger than Cyprus and Malta combined, and almost forty other Indian
tribes are larger than such independent and soveteign states as Barbados. Id. at 163-68.
[Vol. 3
Summer 1976] THE CONSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 673
instances, constitutional principles have been or could have been applied
to protect the rights of American Indians. For example, peyote is
essential to the practice of certain American Indian religions, especially
the Native American Church. Under constitutional principles in-
volving freedom of religion, the use and possession of peyote has been
legally sanctioned." ° On -the other hand, possession and exchange
of feathers restricted by federal conservation legislation continues
to cause problems for Indian religious practices.6"
American Indians have been persecuted for wearing their hair in
a traditional, long, braided style. Again, constitutional principles of
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and prohibitions against racial
discrimination, can and should be used to protect this practice. Liti-
gation over this issue has resulted primarily from situations involving
American Indian students and prison inmates who claimed cultural and
religious rights to wear traditional Indian hair styles in violation of dress
codes.62
Additional civil rights for Indians are established through federal
civil rights legislation, which is protective of all American citizens.
Indian civil rights problems parallel traditional civil rights concerns, i.e.,
the equal administration of justice; the rights to equal education,
employment opportunities, and housing; and political participation.
Despite seeming equality under such laws, American Indians have
60. See State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1973); People
v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
61. See United States v. Doxtator, No. 74-120M (W.D. Okla., Magis. Ct. 1974).
For a more detailed analysis, see Note, Native American Culture: The Use of Feathers
ar a Protected Right, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 105 (Winter, 1974). A policy statement
issued by the Secretary of the Interior, released February 5, 1975, stated that there will
be limited federal prosecution, harrassment, or other interference with American Indians
over the possession and exchange of the feathers of protected species: "The American
Indian may possess, carry, use, wear, give, loan or exchange among other Indians, with-
out compensation, all federally protected birds as well as their parts or feathers. How-
ever, the Department of the Interior will continue to enforce against all persons those
federal laws prohibiting the killing, buying or selling of eagles, migratory birds, or en-
dangered species, as well as those laws prohibiting the buying or selling of the parts
of feathers of such birds and animals."
62. New Rider v. Bd. of Education, 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1097 (1973). In this instance, the federal circuit court rejected the freedom
of speech argument advanced by the American Indian students. In his dissent to the
Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Douglas argued that freedom of speech should protect
this form of expression. The First Amendment principle of freedom of religion could
also be used to protect this form of activity. In Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153
(S.D. Iowa 1974), the court accepted the American Indian prisoners' argument that
freedom of religion permitted them to wear their hair in the traditional long, braided
style.
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problems of a unique character. For example, in the area of the ad-
ministration of justice, Indians suffer from a double standard regarding
arrest and sentencing-especially in regard to charges involving public
intoxication. They are subjected to racist and derogatory treatment
from law enforcement officials. In addition, they have unique cultural
and linguistic problems when forced to deal with the criminal justice
system. Another concern is that an Indian community may in itself
suffer from a lack of adequate police protection, often resulting from
jurisdictional confusion between state and federal authorities. Yet
another problem concerns the justice system's failure to employ Indians
throughout its various components. Also, Indians are conspicuously
absent from juries. Each of the other traditional areas of civil rights
also has special Indian problems.,,
Indians also have unique civil rights and civil liberties problems
based on their special status. The legal bases for these "Indian" rights
and liberties are specific federal legislation, administrative rules and
regulations, and court decisions. As discussed above, the legal infra-
structure for Indian civil liberties is found in the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act.64 Litigation under -the ICRA of general civil liberties claims by
individuals against tribal governments has renewed concern for tribal
sovereignty and the preservation of cultural integrity. Court interpre-
tations of the ICRA have aroused considerable distress within the In-
dian community over the Act's ramifications. Initially, passage of the
ICRA was viewed as an affront to tribal sovereignty because it was
forced on Indian tribes without their consent. It was felt that if the
tribal governments had found this type of legislation desirable, they,
rather than the United States government, should have been responsible
for framing and enacting it. The initial concern crystallized into a
strong and persuasive feeling that the ICRA is a threat to the Indian
community's cultural integrity and preservation. Because the ICRA
reflects European concepts of law and justice, its application can
seriously disrupt and possibly destroy traditionally held Indian social
concepts. Proponents of individual Indian rights are especially con-
cerned that the interpretation and application of the ICRA are in the
hands of non-Indian federal judges, some of whom may be ignorant of
Indian problems.
Those who argue against the ICRA are not opposed to the civil
libertarian principles behind the Act itself, but rather to the procedures
63. Office of General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Check
List of Urban Civil Rights Issues (unpublished memorandum, undated) [hereinafter cited
as Check List of Urban Civil Rights Issues].
64. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-03 (1971).
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used to implement it and the impact that results. 65 Opponents of
the ICRA claim that it is an arrogant imposition of one culture upon
another, and is an extreme example of ethnocentricity. Regardless of
Congress' good intentions, they argue, the ICRA is basically offensive
to the Indian community and has the effect of seriously eroding and
damaging the Indian way of life. It is additionally argued that the
ICRA has serioiisly violated the fundamental rights of Indian people
to self-determination for it is an external dictation of internal tribal
relationships.
Turning to substance, ICRA critics note that in many Indian
societies there are substantial elements of traditional Indian life that
cannot be reconciled with federal constitutional guarantees. For
example, eligibility to participate in tribal government may be limited
by age, sex, religion, or other traditional Indian considerations. Perhaps
more importantly, by encouraging litigation, the ICRA overrides tra-
ditional tribal mechanisms for resolving internal problems. Indian
tribes have traditionally stood in an entirely different relationship to
their members than has a state to its citizens. Many Indian com-
munities are based on extended family principles, and tribal govern-
ment is a part of that system. To invite litigation in federal courts be-
tween a tribe and its members may undermine the integrity of tribal
communities. Finally, the critics maintain, Indian tribes should have
the right to opt for a closed society, which implies a right to limit ex-
ternal interference. 66
Because of its controversial nature in the Indian community, the
ICRA has been the subject of several repeal and reform efforts. 67 None
has been successful, however, and the best alternative seems to focus
on obtaining from federal courts a flexible interpretation of the ICRA.
This could succeed if sufficient deference is shown to the culture and
traditions of the particular Indian community involved in the liti-
gation. In applying the ICRA, federal courts have been urged to
use it only as a guideline, and to interpret it within the cultural milieu
of the particular Indian community. Courts have also been asked to
use experts to formulate a policy for each -particular tribal legal sys-
tem. In interpreting the ICRA, a federal court should realize that a
literal interpretation of some of the provisions would seriously under-
65. Indian Rights Committee, American Civil Liberties Union Report to the
ACLU Board of Directors 8-10 (November 20, 1974, unpublished).
66. Id. at 9.
67. One reform that has been proposed is the establishment of an inter-tribal Indian
court of appeals that would oversee tribal courts administering the ICRA.
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mine a tribe's cultural autonomy. The essential question at issue in
interpreting the ICRA is whether Congress' use of "constitutional
language" is to be understood as requiring modification of tribal gov-
eminent procedures and laws to fully comply with the same constitu-
tional standards imposed on state and federal governments regardless
of the disruption to the tribal cultures, or whether the language chosen
by Congress merely requires the courts to meet the harder challenge
of evolving constitutional standards appropriate to and compatible with
individual rights concepts held by Indian tribes. In other words, should
the ICRA standards be interpreted in an Indian context and from an
Indian perspective? This issue presently remains undecided. How-
ever, a trend appears to favor interpretation from the Indian perspec-
tive.68
Indian civil rights affect the entire Indian community. Indian
civil rights problems involved the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the
Indian Health Service, and various other governmental agencies and
programs concerned with Indian affairs. Regarding services provided by
the government, controversy has centered around standards of eligibili-
ty, quantity, and quality of services. More specific problems evolve
from Indian programs and services in the areas of: (1) education
-such as the Johnson-O'Malley program and the Federal Impact Aid
program; (2) federal welfare programs, BIA General Assistance, and
various state welfare programs; and (3) health, through the Indian
Health Service and various federal health programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid. In addition to the traditional civil rights areas, prob-
lems arise as Indians seek access -to credit and small business opera-
tions, as well as utilities or services on 'reservations. The status of
Indian land ownership or possession creates. special problems, as do
exceptions sometimes granted to hunting and fishing regulations in
recognition of Indians' traditional ways. 9
Conclusion
To understand why these problems exist for the American Indian
we must understand that the Indian community is under tremendous
pressure, as evidenced by various social and economic indicators of
community well-being. Recognizing some internal pressures, it must be
noted that most of the problems emanate from the external world, that
is, the Anglo-American culture. Internally, the Indian communities have
68. PRICE, supra note 5, at 761-78; Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights and the
Constitutional Status of Tribal Government, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1343, 1353-68 (1969).
69. See Check List of Urban Civil Rights Issues, supra note 63.
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governed themselves with considerable success for over 25,000 years.
Their problems at present are those of a community under assault-
assault from a dominant society that intentionally or inadvertently seems
bent on their destruction. Protection from the dominant society, then,
is a principal legal need of the Indian community.
Perhaps the American Indian can find justification for celebration
of the American Bicentennial in the very principles the Bicentennial
represents: revolutionary legal and political change, the creation of a
nation, and the establishment of individual rights. These are the same
objectives that the Indian community today seeks to achieve. In the
spirit of the Bicentennial, then, American Indians may pursue a revo-
lution through law based on constitutional principles. Accordingly,
Indian advocates should demand and secure the constitutional right to
be Indian. This would involve the right of Indian tribes to exist as
tribal sovereignties, operating on a basis of self-determination and
with the concomitant rights to protect and enhance Indian cultural life.
At the same time, in balance with the right to tribal sovereignty, a right
for individual Indians to live their lives with appropriate civil rights
guarantees would exist. Thus in interpreting the United States Consti-
tution, the courts and Congress must continue to recognize and protect
both tribal sovereignty and existence, and individual Indians in the
exercise of their rights as Indians and citizens, ever mindful of the deli-
cate balancing of interests that every such case warrants.
After 200 years, the physical genocide practiced by the United
States against the Indian people has abated. It must not take another
200 years of American history to see the abatement of the cultural
genocide practiced against the American Indian. As the court said in
People v. Woody:70
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity,
the protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individ-
ual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying
currents of the subcultures 'that flow into the mainstream of our
national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater
value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the
Indians .... 71
There has been, there is, and there must continue to be, the legal
right to be Indian.
70. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
71. Id. at 727, 394 P.2d at 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.

